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--- chat_control [2026/08/13 12:01] – ultracomfy
+++ chat_control [2026/08/17 08:43] (current) – ultracomfy
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 The exact implications of Chat Control are that any online correspondence (ie. conversations on WhatsApp, E-Mail, Signal, Telegram, Discord, etc.) are sent to the government as copies before they are sent to the intended recipient. This means a message will be sent twice. In both cases, the messages are encrypted - a message will be sent to the government with encryption, and it will send the message to the intended recipient encrypted as well. Nobody outside of you, the intended recipient and, well, the government will be able to read the messages. But, crucially, it means that the government will be able to read the messages. This is a big problem, as it gives a government direct access to an immense amount of data of its citizens. If you remember East Berlin and how agents at the post office opened, read, and then resealed letters sent between people to keep detailed profiles on 100% of the population - the Chat Control legislation is everything you need to make that a reality. In fact, since this is digital, no opening/closing is required and everything can be condensed using advanced algorithms or even AI, it would be naive to think that the government //wouldn't//. And while you may have nothing to hide, this still gives the government a lot of leverage over you. If the government ends up not liking you - for any reason, ideologically or even just personally - this data can be weaponized against you.
-The goal of laws like "secrecy of the mail" is to make it impossible for such a thing to even be possible. The makers of these kinds of laws, back in the day, knew, that no government should ever be trusted with not spying on its people at such a scale. So instead of trusting the government to "please don't do the evil", they just declared that it should be illegal for anyone to open anyone's letters, for whatever reason. They knew that if the government was given the option to open letters at all, that such would be too much of an invitation to just do it with //every// letter. Therefore: No opening of letters //at all//.
+After East Berlin, the makers of these laws were smart enough to realize that they shouldn't just ban mass surveillance, they should make it impossible for mass surveillance to happen in the first place. The goal of laws like "secrecy of the mail" is to make it impossible for such a thing to even be possible. They knew that if the government was given the option to open letters at all, that such would be too much of an invitation to just do it with //every// letter. Therefore: No opening of letters //at all//.
-By one way or another, Chat Control levers away end-to-end encryption. Sure, the transfer between you and the government, as well as the transfer between you and the recipient are both technically still end-to-end encrypted, but it is now amputated to make the encryption fail at the exact task it is meant to do: To prevent illegitimate and unethical access to someone's messages.
 ===== 1. Proportionality ======
-As a society, we generally //want// to let everyone live the way they want. Government surveillance has aspects that are inherently contradictory to this premise - however, there are areas in which governmental precautions are necessary to maintain law and order, and to protect individuals from abuse. This is typically seen as a tradeoff: Cameras in high-risk areas, such as train stations, are an acceptable restriction on privacy if it means reducing the risk of assaults. But, cameras with facial tracking and large databases to track citizen movement restrict privacy much more than necessary, and the additional reduction in assault risk are not worth the harm done by such automated systems.
+As a society, we generally //want// to let everyone live the way they want. Government surveillance has aspects that are inherently contradictory to this premise - however, there are areas in which governmental precautions are necessary to maintain law and order, and to protect individuals from abuse. This is typically seen as a tradeoff: Cameras in high-risk areas, such as train stations, are an acceptable restriction on privacy if it means reducing the risk of assaults. But, cameras with facial tracking and large databases to track citizen movement restrict privacy much more than necessary, and the additional reduction in assault risk are not worth the harm (or potential for harm) done by such automated systems.
-This is called "proportionality". Restrictions in freedom, safety or privacy are only acceptable insofar that the restrictions serve a higher imperative. The exact value of that imperative must be assessed, and the restrictions be finely tuned to be as unrestrictive as possible while still satisfying that imperative.
+This is called "proportionality". Restrictions in freedom, safety or privacy are only acceptable insofar that the restrictions serve a higher imperative. The exact value of that imperative must be assessed, and the restrictions be finely tuned to be as unrestrictive as possible while still satisfying that imperative. In other words, some risk or harm is okay, but at some point it's not okay anymore. Any restriction of a citizen's privacy needs to be justified and weighed against what you are trying to achieve.
-The difference in restrictiveness can be seen all the time in the public: At a soccer stadium in Germany, pre-entrance pat-downs are the default, and security is on site. At a courthouse or the airport, proper inspections of human and carriage, complete with metal detection and X-Rays is normal, as these are more critical infrastructure and higher-value targets. Grocery stores come with cameras only, maybe a store detective. Concerts get security at levels comparable to soccer games. Open air, public events, due to their open nature, do not typically have pat-downs at the entrance, but a considerable guard presence is good practice.
+The difference in restrictiveness can be seen all the time in the public. Compare these: At a soccer stadium in Germany, pre-entrance pat-downs are the default, and security is on site. At a courthouse or the airport, proper inspections of human and carriage, complete with metal detection and X-Rays is normal, as these are more critical infrastructure. Grocery stores come with cameras only, maybe a store detective. Concerts get security at levels comparable to soccer games. Open air, public events, due to their open nature, do not typically have pat-downs at the entrance, but a considerable guard presence is good practice.
 It should go without saying that abolishing secrecy of correspondence altogether is proportionate for pretty much nothing. The restriction of privacy being discussed is virtually limitless and comes with privacy and security concerns that are indefensible. Before all online correspondence is laid open to the government, the country should rather just shut down the internet. If the threat is as large as to make you consider abolishing privacy as we know it, shutting down the internet in your country is the better solution that does less damage.
-We are prepared for cases where people cannot be trusted with their communications. Laws give courts the power to issue wiretaps for individuals where it is believed that a wiretap is proportional. Either to prove that they have already done something bad, or in case they are about to do something bad. But, importantly, the natural restriction here is that wiretapping is always only for one individual, is not centralized and requires lengthy court proceedings. Wiretaps are expensive and done only when absolutely necessary. Its non-centralized structure makes the process intentionally slow. There are a lot of checks and balances in place before and after a wiretap is issued. All this means that a bad actor is //not capable// of weaponizing this system at scale. You can get one or two wiretaps in, but its non-centralized structure means you cannot ever get hundreds or even thousands of people at once. But, it works fast in reverse - if fraudulent wiretaps are found, they can be terminated extremely quickly and undo or stop a lot of damage overnight.
+Additionally, we **are** prepared for cases where people cannot be trusted with their communications. Laws give courts the power to issue wiretaps for individuals where it is believed that a wiretap is proportional. Either to prove that they have already done something bad, or in case they are about to do something bad. But, importantly, the natural restriction here is that wiretapping is always only for one individual, is not centralized and requires lengthy court proceedings. Wiretaps are expensive and done only when absolutely necessary. Its non-centralized structure makes the process intentionally slow. There are a lot of checks and balances in place before and after a wiretap is issued. All this means that a bad actor is //not capable// of weaponizing this system at scale. You can get one or two wiretaps in, but its non-centralized structure means you cannot ever get hundreds or even thousands of people at once. But, it works fast in reverse - if fraudulent wiretaps are found, they can be terminated extremely quickly and undo or stop a lot of damage overnight.
 Chat Control circumvents all that. It means that, now, everyone is centrally wiretapped by default, and is at the mercy of their government to (1) not get databreached (2) not turn hostile against its citizens (3) not use the wiretaps to profile its citizens (4) use the data to engage in discrimination or (5) get any worse ideas. Governments are powerful and can do all kinds of things to citizens it doesn't like. The people who invented secrecy of correspondence laws did it intentionally to limit the government's ability to do harm in case the government ever turns hostile. And governments do turn hostile - for many people, the government already is: Whether you're gay, trans, of a certain religion, of a certain color or criticize the government, for a lot of people this is very relevant when talking about the government. In some countries, things like these are illegal and will get you jailed - or burned. In some countries, criticizing the current administration may result in you getting fired from your job.
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 As a last word: There is a painful irony in this whole plot. Conversation of child abuse typically talks about a stranger on the internet seeking out vulnerable children online and trying to build rapport. If anything ever comes from Chat Control, it will be a widespread realization amongst the populace that the child abusers are not random strangers - abusers are all amongst us. They are people your child knows and is close to. Your husband. The child's uncle. Your mother. Odds are you are the abuser yourself. Anyone in your family or extended family. Or your local clergy, I guess. Child abuse will be found where people have access to children - so that's not a random stranger online whose chatlogs in case of an incident will be the first thing the police checks. It will happen primarily inside the family - //especially// parents - or any occupations close to children.
 ===== 2. Responsibility =====
 Western society values individualism. Communal institutions are mostly limited to what's efficient and convenient - ie. kindergarten and school - but even these are geared towards preparing a child for living individually. As such, our society does what I will call "delegation of responsibility". The commune is not responsible for everything your child does. Your child is viewed as "yours" and, until it reaches maturity, the child is primarily //your// responsibility.